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ABSTRACT
Using data about the US banking industry, the study investigates how 
the support disclosed by funds in corporate meetings influences the 
success of the completion of mergers and acquisitions (M&A). The 
methodological approach relies on the use of instrumental variables 
with the generalised method of moments (GMM). The results indicate 
that the voting support exercises a negative influence over the success 
of M&A, validating the probable presence of agency-driven behaviour 
in explaining M&A completion, and indicating that low governance 
and activism inspires independent behaviour of managers, proceeding 
against the wishes, position or interests of shareholders. Considering 
that voting performance has been reported as a proxy for reputational 
harm, the results provide some understanding about how the success 
in M&A in the US banking industry may be related to reputational 
consequences infiltrated through voting decisions.
1. Introduction
The contribution of corporate reputation to the value creation process for the firm is well 
documented through literature (de Marcellis-Warin & Teodoresco, 2012; Gaultier-Gaillard 
& Louisot, 2006). Corporate reputation management implies taking care of communica-
tions between the company and its environment (Atkins, Drennan, & Bates, 2006; Hebb, 
Hamilton, & Hachigian, 2010; Pineiro-Chousa, Vizcaíno-González, & López-Cabarcos, 
2016; Richardson, 2009; Roberts, 2003), dealing with several social and environmental issues 
that have reputational influence (Kubicek, Bhanugopan, & Fish, 2013; Pineiro-Chousa, 
Vizcaíno-González, López-Cabarcos, & Romero-Castro, 2017). Therefore, if this relation 
between the firm and its environment is insufficiently managed it may result in a severe 
damage to corporate reputation, which can be collected through the voting pattern showed 
by shareholders, given that votes withheld for directors’ election have been proposed as a 
measure of reputational damage and as an indicator of harm to reputational capital (Bernile 
& Jarrell, 2009).
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The aim of this study is to investigate the influence of the voting pattern observed in 
corporate meetings over the success in the completion of mergers and acquisitions (M&A) 
from a reputational point of view. In this sense, it is interesting to note that the voting pattern 
has been previously proposed as an indirect measure of reputational penalties (Bernile & 
Jarrell, 2009; Ertimur, Ferri, & Maber, 2012; Ferri & Maber, 2013). Also, it has to be taken 
into account that there is a novel branch of investigation connecting M&A with economic 
downturns, with evidences that present M&A as an efficient reaction to economic adjust-
ment in situations where the sensitivity to reputation related issues tends to result intensified 
(Andrade & Stafford, 2004; Mitchell & Mulherin, 1996; Mulherin & Boone, 2000). So, we 
predict that the voting pattern may exercise some influence over the degree of completion 
of M&A in a context of economic shock and, consequently, M&A can be understood as a 
reputational response derived from a critical context, catalysed through the voting pattern. 
In order to assess the purpose of this research, we choose to study the US banking industry 
since the banking industry has been referred to be especially prone to reputational aspects 
(Allen & Santomero, 1997; Allen & Santomero, 2001; Bhattacharya & Thakor, 1993), and 
actually several firms from the US banking industry have suffered from well-known rep-
utational scandals (Fiordelisi, Soana, & Schwizer, 2013). In addition, during the period 
covered in our sample, US banks have been affected by many rumours and attempts of 
M&A, making this set of companies a particularly suitable framework for this research. 
So, the novel contribution of this article relies on addressing the linkage between voting 
pattern and M&A completion, taking advantage of the appropriateness characterising the 
US banking industry in recent times, and from a fresh reputational perspective, something 
that to our knowledge has not been done yet.
2. Literature review
Assessing the motivations of voting decisions and their link to corporate performance is a 
prominent branch of research, mainly focused on votes concerning proposals on directors’ 
election (Cai, Garner, & Walkling, 2009; Hillman, Shropshire, Certo, Dalton, & Dalton, 
2011) and executive compensation (Cai & Walkling, 2011; Fischer, Gramlich, Miller, & 
White, 2009). In this sense, it is worthwhile mentioning that there is extensive investigation 
on the connection between voting behaviour and corporate reputation, with the voting 
pattern concerning directors’ election proposed as a proxy for reputational harm (Choi, 
Fisch, & Kahan, 2008; Cuñat, Gine, & Guadalupe, 2013; Ertimur, Ferri, & Oesch, 2013; 
Fischer et al., 2009; Yahr, 2013). However, the linkage between this voting performance and 
the success of M&A remains unexplored. Thus, our first proposition establishes that there 
may be some sort of relation between these two variables.
Proposition 1: Votes regarding directors’ election and executive compensation influence the 
completion of M&A.
Around M&A, the classical scholar research includes extensive literature on the reasons 
that drive mergers (that is, the pre-merger analysis), as well as their consequences (namely, 
the post-merger analysis), usually consisting on measuring the operation performance 
based on the stock market evolution, with the banking sector as a prominent target of 
research (Bernad, Fuentelsaz, & Gomez, 2013; Figueira & Nellis, 2009; Ismail, Davidson, & 
Frank, 2009; Jagtiani, Kotliar, & Maingi, 2016; Lee, 2013). We specially focus on the phase 
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culminating in the achievement of the merger after the announcement, discussing and 
analysing the motivations that conduct to M&A. In this field of research, there are three 
classic hypotheses that explain the behaviour of these operations (Seth, Song, & Pettit, 
2000): synergy hypothesis that justify M&A by the interest of shareholders in value creation, 
considering that the sum of the combined value of the firms is higher than their separate 
values (Fulghieri & Hodrick, 2006); hubris hypothesis about how mergers are performed by 
an error in the valuation of target companies by managers, due to managerial behavioural 
issues (Hayward & Hambrick, 1997; Lawrence, Pazzaglia, & Sonpar, 2011; Roll, 1986); and 
the agency theory suggesting that M&A activity is driven by the managers’ incentive to 
achieve their firms’ growth, so managers of the bidding firm are the ones deciding to carry 
out the acquisition and the amount to pay for it, rather than the shareholders (Achampong 
& Zemedkun, 1995; Morck, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1990). Given these circumstances, the reason 
for acquisitions may not be shareholder value maximisation, but managerial self-interests 
and their private benefits (Bradley, Desai, & Kim, 1988; DeLong, 2003; Porrini, 2006; Shim, 
2011).
Also, there is a recent trend of research linking M&A with economic downturns, with 
proof of M&A being an efficient reaction to economic adjustment in situations where 
the sensitivity to reputation related issues raises (Andrade & Stafford, 2004; Mitchell & 
Mulherin, 1996; Mulherin & Boone, 2000). Additionally, reputational risk management in 
the banking business is becoming a prominent research topic, because of various scandals 
occurred in recent times (Fiordelisi et al., 2013). That is why we argue that the recent finan-
cial crisis is likely to have affected the success of M&A in this industry.
Proposition 2: The completion of M&A in the banking industry is affected by a context of 
financial downturn.
3. Data
The voting data refer to managerial proposals presented in corporate meetings. These data 
are taken from the non-profit and non-partisan organisation ProxyDemocracy, which col-
lects official votes disclosed through SEC N-PC filings by funds, and which has been recently 
referred as a suitable provider of this type of data for research aims (Burns & Minnick, 2013; 
Pineiro-Chousa, Vizcaíno-González, & Caby, 2016; Vizcaíno & Chousa, 2016). The final 
sample comprises 309 US banks with 95,234 votes regarding managerial proposals during 
the 2003–2013 period.
The data concerning M&A were obtained from the Thomson Reuters One-banker data-
base, which collects data about corporate M&A, reporting the stage of the process: com-
pleted, pending, rumoured, intended, etc. We filtered the data to detect M&A completed 
operations related to the 309 US banks and the 11-year period referred in our sample. Also, 
we left out the operations where the acquirer and the target were the same company, to 
exclude operations like repurchasing of own shares.
Finally, we also collected data about financial and economic indicators extracted from 
Bankscope, a database of banks’ financial statements, ratings and intelligence that contains 
comprehensive information on banks worldwide. From this database, we filtered the eco-
nomic and financial data regarding the 309 banks and the 11 years contained in our sample.
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4. Method and variables
In this section, we provide a description of the model, as well as the variables used for the 
estimation.
4.1. Model
The ordinary least squares (OLS) schema and the generalised least squares (GLS) frame-
work are suitable methodologies to investigate the relation between the voting pattern 
and the M&A completion. Nevertheless, none of these ones permits dealing appropriately 
with endogeneity problems. So, if we can find one or more variables strongly related with 
the voting pattern and, at the same time, uncorrelated with the M&A completion, we can 
use a methodology based on instrumental variables, that has been reported to be useful in 
dealing with endogeneity issues.
We begin by establishing this system of equations that is appropriate for estimation using 
the generalised method of moments (GMM):
 
 
In equation 1, mait is the M&A completion ratio of bank i in year t, α1 is the constant term 
of the equation; β is the estimated coefficient of the second stage for v, which is the endoge-
nous variable standing for the voting pattern; γ1are the estimated coefficients of the second 
stage for the exogenous variables xit-1 that are being used as control variables; δt are year 
dummies; 
1it represents the errors term. In equation 2, vit-1 is the voting pattern related 
to bank i in year t-1; α2 is the constant term of the equation; θ is the estimated coefficient 
of the first stage for zit-1, which are the variables used as instruments; γ2 are the estimated 
coefficients of the first stage for the exogenous variables xit-1; δt are year dummies; 2it repre-
sents the errors term. This system of equations is solved through a GMM schema. Thus, the 
coefficient β can be thought as the quantitative and qualitative effect of the voting pattern 
over the M&A completion.
4.2. M&A completion ratio
We calculate the following ratio: 1+c
1+nc
− 1. In this ratio, c represents the proportion of com-
pleted M&A for a given year and a certain bank, either as the acquirer or the target, con-
sidering that the acquirer and the target must be different companies, as stated before. In 
addition, nc represents the proportion of M&A for the same bank and the same year, under 
the same conditions described above, whose stage is different from complete (that is, not 
completed M&A). This ratio is an indicator of the M&A completion, and is rated on a scale 
from -0.5 (null completion) to 1 (full completion). If it takes values under 0, it means that 
there are more uncompleted operations than completed operations, and the imbalance 
gets stronger as the ratio decreases. If it takes values over 0, it means that there are more 
completed operations than uncompleted operations, and the imbalance is stronger as the 
(1)mait = 1 + vit−1 + 1xit−1 + t + 1it
(2)vit−1 = 2 + zit−1 + 2xit−1 + t + 2it
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value increases. Therefore, a value of 0 represents the equilibrium or breakeven point and 
stands for a perfect balance between completed and uncompleted M&A.
4.3. Voting pattern
Regarding the data on votes emitted by funds in corporate meetings held by banks in our 
study, we compute this ratio: 1+f
1+nf
− 1. In this ratio, f stands for the proportion of ‘for’ or 
‘pro-votes’ for a certain bank and year, and nf stands for the proportion of ‘non-pro votes’, 
including both ‘abstain’ and ‘against’ votes, for the same bank and year. Combining ‘against’ 
and ‘abstain’ votes is a classic system used by the governance industry to calculate a measure 
of discordance (Gregory-Smith & Main, 2013). So, this ratio can be thought as a measure of 
the support showed by funds to managerial proposals, and it takes values from -0.5, which 
would mean total denial, to 1, meaning total support. If its value is negative, funds mostly 
refuse managerial proposals. On the other hand, if its value is positive, funds mostly support 





. Here, nov stands for the 
total number of votes showed by funds for a certain bank and year, and nof stands for the 
total number of funds emitting votes for the same bank and year. This ratio provides the 
average number of votes that each fund discloses. Finally, we calculate the voting pattern 
as a multiplication of these two ratios.
4.4. Control variables
In this section, we describe the exogenous variables that are used as control variables in our 
model. This means that they appear as explanatory variables for both the M&A completion 
ratio and the voting pattern indicator. In our study, we include five different control variables:
•  Net profit per share for a certain bank and a given year (netpro_ps).
•  Dividends per share for a certain bank and a given year (div_ps).
•  Price to earnings ratio: ratio relating the market capitalisation with the net profit for 
a certain bank and a given year (per).
•  Leverage: ratio relating book value of liabilities with book value of equity for a certain 
bank and a certain year (lev).
•  Return on equity: ratio relating net profit with book value of equity for a certain bank 
and a given year (roe).
A reasonable connection between each one of the control variables and the M&A com-
pletion ratio can be established in accordance with literature. Thus, market value (price to 
earnings ratio) and performance measures (net profit or dividends per share) have been 
pointed out by former studies (Chikh, & Filbien, 2011). There are other remarkable refer-
ences, like Harford (1999) for leverage, and Morck, Shleifer & Vishny (1990) for return on 
equity. Hence, the success in M&A completion is likely to get higher if the value of return 
on equity gets higher, and if the value of the leverage ratio or the price to earnings ratio 
gets lower. In addition, a reasonable link between each one of the control variables and 
the voting pattern can be easily made. Thus, if a bank presents high values regarding net 
profit per share, dividends per share or return on equity, its stakeholders are more likely to 
support its proposals.
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4.5. Instrumental variables
In this section, we describe the instrumental variables used in our study. These are explan-
atory variables for the voting pattern, that is, they are included in the second equation, but 
they are not included in the first equation as explanatory variables for the M&A completion 
ratio. With the purpose of dealing appropriately with endogeneity, at least one instrument 
is needed. In our research, we include two different instruments:
•  Natural log of the total number of votes emitted by funds for a certain bank and a 
given year.
•  Natural log of the total number of funds voting in corporate meetings for a certain 
bank and a given year.
The link between each one of these instruments and the instrumented variable comes 
straightforwardly.
5. Results and discussion
Table 1 presents summary statistics for the key variables in our research. Concerning the 
M&A completion ratio, its mean value is 0.8283, that is, there are more completed operations 
than uncompleted ones, since its value is above 0
Table 2 informs about the correlations between the crucial variables in our study. We can 
see that there is a negative relation between the voting pattern and the M&A completion 
ratio, indicating that if the voting pattern ratio decreases, the M&A completion tends to 
get higher, and vice versa.
Now, we study the influence of the voting pattern indicator reported in section 4.3 over 
the M&A completion ratio calculated as explained in section 4.2. We use the control vari-
ables detailed in section 4.4. In addition, we consider as instruments for the estimation of 
the voting pattern the variables described in section 4.5. Finally, we include year dummies 
to consider year fixed effects. We also provide p-values related to standard errors. Table 3 
presents the results of the GMM estimation with instrumental variables (IV-GMM). Also, 
OLS and GLS estimation results are provided to allow comparison
The voting pattern is significant at a 5% level and its associated coefficient is negative 
(-0.3934), confirming Proposition 1. So, when the support showed by funds to managerial 
proposals decreases in 1 unit, it results in an increase of 0.3934 units in the M&A completion 
ratio. The lack of funds’ support through their voting behaviour could be justified due to a 
Table 1. summary statistics for main variables.
note: the sample contains observations for 309 banks in the 2003–2013 period.
source: authors’ calculations.
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
m&a completion ratio 109 0.8283 0.3593 −0.2857 1.0000
voting pattern 1333 0.7480 0.8806 −1.4167 2.8332
net profit per share 2103 0.4703 23.4678 −901.5190 219.2830
Dividends per share 1929 0.7741 4.2583 0.0000 91.6440
Price to earnings ratio 2102 16.1643 127.4574 −2913.1500 3184.7390
Leverage 2163 0.8651 0.1322 0.0000 1.0004
Return on equity 2152 0.1143 3.4109 −9.6095 157.4393
natural log funds 1333 1.4249 1.0166 0.0000 4.7958
natural log votes 1333 3.1668 1.3075 0.0000 7.6401
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negative managerial performance evaluation, or by low corporate governance or activism. 
In the first case, the choice to proceed with a corporate transaction demonstrates a strong 
decision of managers suggesting a behavioural explanation, which may be justified by the 
agency theory (Fassin & Gosselin, 2011). In the second case, the literature supports that 
when there is little or weak governance, managers can pay premiums for acquisitions, and 
therefore they can carry them out (Hayward & Hambrick, 1997; Walters, Kroll, & Wright, 
2007). In this sense, activism by institutional investors has been suggested as being an 
instrument in halting the destruction of shareholder wealth and redirecting the firm (Bruner, 
1999; Cespa & Cestone, 2007).
Turning the sights towards the control variables, net profit per share results significant 
at a 10% level, and its associated coefficient is negative, so when the net profit per share is 
lower it guides to a higher level of completion in M&A. The dividends per share variable 
results not significant, either at a 5% or a 10% level, so it is not relevant in explaining the 
completion of M&A. The price to earnings ratio results significant at a 5% level and its 
Table 2. correlations for main variables.
note: the sample contains observations for 309 banks in the 2003–2013 period.
source: authors’ calculations.
M&A Voting Netpro_ps Div_ps PER Leverage ROE
m&a 1.0000
voting −0.3436 1.0000
netpro_ps −0.1647 0.0378 1.0000
Div_ps −0.1994 0.1355 −0.3582 1.0000
PER 0.0949 −0.2160 0.0710 0.0413 1.0000
Leverage −0.3324 0.2648 −0.0136 0.2451 −0.5226 1.0000
RoE 0.0034 0.1647 0.5981 −0.3755 −0.2235 0.2746 1.0000
Table 3. Results of oLs, GLs and iv-Gmm estimations for voting pattern and m&a completion.
note: coefficients that are statistically significant at the 5% level are in bold. coefficients that are statistically significant at 
the 10% level are in bold and italics. the sample contains observations for 309 banks in the 2003–2013 period.
source: authors’ calculations.
                            M&A completion ratio
  OLS GLS IV-GMM
voting pattern −0.2169 (p = 0.001) −0.2169 (p = 0.000) −0.3934 (p = 0.000)
net profit per share −0.0109 (p = 0.087) −0.0109 (p = 0.035) −0.0091 (p = 0.089)
Dividends per share 0.0073 (p = 0.713) 0.0073 (p = 0.624) 0.0118 (p = 0.489)
Price to earnings ratio −0.0037 (p = 0.019) −0.0037 (p = 0.020) −0.0052 (p = 0.001)
Leverage −4.6774 (p = 0.004) −4.6774 (p = 0.000) −4.7733 (p = 0.010)
Return on equity 2.4921 (p = 0.033) 2.4921 (p = 0.000) 2.8597 (p = 0.018)
year 2003 (omitted) (omitted) (omitted)
year 2004 (omitted) (omitted) (omitted)
year 2005 −0.3702 (p = 0.019) 0.0489 (p = 0.835) 0.1622 (p = 0.463)
year 2006 −0.3753 (p = 0.039) 0.0438 (p = 0.794) 0.0980 (p = 0.639)
year 2007 −0.1179 (p = 0.462) 0.3012 (p = 0.241) 0.4250 (p = 0.133)
year 2008 −0.6200 (p = 0.062) −0.2010 (p = 0.649) −0.0202 (p = 0.953)
year 2009 (omitted) 0.4191 (p = 0.099) 0.6130 (p = 0.006)
year 2010 0.0247 (p = 0.854) 0.4438 (p = 0.045) 0.5820 (p = 0.018)
year 2011 −0.6832 (p = 0.001) −0.2641 (p = 0.363) −0.1862 (p = 0.451)
year 2012 −0.7707 (p = 0.000) −0.3516 (p = 0.150) −0.3856 (p = 0.097)
year 2013 −0.4191 (p = 0.054) (omitted) (omitted)
R-squared 0.5559 0.5559 0.4700
hansen’s test 0.1052 (p = 0.746)
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associated coefficient is negative, so when the price to earnings ratio is lower it guides to a 
higher level of completion of M&A. The leverage ratio results significant at a 5% level and 
its associated coefficient is negative, so when the leverage ratio is lower it guides to a higher 
level of completion of M&A. The return on equity ratio results significant at a 5% level, and 
its associated coefficient is positive, so when the return on equity ratio is higher it guides 
to a higher level of completion of M&A.
Regarding year dummies, 2009 and 2010 are significant at a 5% level, with positive 
coefficients. So, there is a rise in the completion observed in M&A focused in the period 
2009–2010. This phenomenon can be considered as an adjustment process because of the 
financial crisis starting in 2007–2008, confirming Proposition 2. This is consistent with 
previous empirical results suggesting that crises are significant events for both acquirers 
and targets: acquirers seek out relatively larger targets and offer larger merger bid premiums 
(Dunn, Intintoli, & McNutt, 2015).
To check the accuracy of the selected methodology, we test the null hypothesis of exog-
eneity, or no endogeneity, between the voting pattern and the M&A completion ratio using 
the difference-in-Sargan C statistic (Hayashi, 2000). The computed statistic shows a value of 
4.5330 (p = 0.0332), that is, the null hypothesis can be rejected at a 5% level. In conclusion, 
voting pattern needs to be included as an endogenous variable for the estimation of the 
M&A completion ratio. So, the choice of the instrumental variables methodology is suitable 
for our research. The next step requires that we study if the selected instrumental variables 
are appropriate. With that purpose, we test the null hypothesis of weak instruments. The 
resulting F-statistic of the first-stage regression shows a value of 12.0563 (p = 0.0001), above 
the proposed frontier value of 10 (Stock, Wright, & Yogo, 2002). In addition, it is also above 
the Cragg and Donald minimum eigenvalue statistic (Cragg & Donald, 1993), which shows 
a value of 8.1848. So, the null hypothesis of weakness in the instruments should be rejected. 
Finally, we compute the Hansen’s J statistic, whose value is provided with the estimation 
results, to test for over-identifying restrictions (Hansen, 1982). A significant test can show 
that there is a void instrument, or that some equation of the model is defectively specified. 
We cannot reject, so the selected instruments result adequate for our analysis. To sum up, 
all tests show that the choice of the instrumental variables with GMM methodology is a 
convenient choice.
Our results are consistent with previous academic research when analysing the influ-
ence over the M&A result and the post-M&A value creation of certain parameters, such 
as leverage (Check, Walker, & Randall Ka, 2009; Ghosh & Jain, 2000; Gugler, Mueller, 
& Weichselbaumer, 2012), return on equity (Bruner, 2004; Lozano-Vivas, Kumbhakar, 
Fethi, & Shaban, 2011; Salter & Weinhold, 1979; Shim, 2011), and price to earnings ratio 
(Sudarsanam & Mahate, 2003). Regarding the influence of the voting pattern over the M&A 
completion, the results corroborate the possible existence of agency-driven behaviour in 
explaining M&A completion. They are also consistent with low governance and activism 
encouraging independent behaviour of managerial proceeding, against the wishes, position 
or interests of shareholders. In addition, given that voting behaviour has been reported as 
a useful proxy for reputational damage (Bernile & Jarrell, 2009; Ertimur et al., 2012), our 
results provide some insights about how the completion degree of M&A may be related to 
the reputational pitfalls characterising the critical period that a number of companies from 
the US banking industry are dealing with in recent times.
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6. Conclusion
Using data regarding US companies in the banking sector, we study how the voting pattern 
showed by funds in corporate meetings influences the completion of M&A operations 
throughout the 2003–2013 period. We choose the instrumental variables methodology as 
a suitable schema for our estimation, because it allows us dealing appropriately with con-
sidering voting pattern as an endogenous variable for the explanation of M&A completion.
The results of our research show that voting pattern demonstrates a negative influence 
over the M&A completion. These findings validate the probable presence of agency-driven 
behaviour in explaining M&A completion, and the fact that low governance and activism 
inspires independent behaviour of managerial proceeding, against the wishes, position or 
interests of shareholders.
Considering that voting pattern has been reported as a useful proxy for reputational 
harm, and since US banks have been especially sensitive to reputational issues in latter times, 
our results give some understandings about how M&A may be interpreted as a reputational 
response in a context of economic adjustment.
Our results enlarge the corporate governance field of research, by linking the support to 
directors’ election and executive compensation proposals to M&A success, something that 
to the best of our knowledge has not been done yet. It is also a contribution to corporate 
reputation related research, in so far as it highlights that there is a reputational dimension 
in M&A processes. Finally, it expands the body of knowledge around M&A by suggesting 
that when they are used as an adjustment mechanism during economic downturns there 
is a reputational underlying explanation.
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